Weisberg: Canadian Signal Piracy Revisted in Light of United States Ratific

CANADIAN SIGNAL PIRACY REVISITED IN
LIGHT OF UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF
THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE
BERNE CONVENTION: IS THIS A BLUEPRINT
FOR GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION?
I.

INTRODUCTION

More than twenty years ago, Marshall McLuhan, a visionary
Canadian, observed that the world was becoming a "global village"
due to the homogenizing effect of available electronic technologies.1 Since his observation, the world has grown increasingly
smaller through the evolution of technologies, such as satellite
broadcasting, and as industrialized nations have entered the Information Age. 2 Although the world is dominated by fewer images,
the voracious audience for these images continues to expand on a
global scale. Resultant electronic piracy of television signals, a recent global problem that is on the rise, owes its impetus to advances in communications technology. 3
The United States is the world's largest exporter of intellectual property;' an export that generates a trade surplus in excess of
1.5 billion dollars annually. 6 Despite a black bottom line, United
States intellectual property industries are plagued by sophisticated
global piracy of their copyrighted products. 6 To date, neither the
public nor the private sector has found a successful means of ending this piracy despite the use of negotiation and consultation with
offending nations, international conventions, retaliation and
linkage, and sophisticated deterrent technology. 7 Piracy costs the
television and film industries approximately 1.5 billion dollars an1. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, VITAL LINKS: CANADIAN CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 11 (1987) [hereinafter VITAL LINKS].
2. See Parker, The Free-Trade Challenge, CAN. F., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 29, 31.
3. See Price, International Copyright Protection, Licensing and the Collection and
Distribution of Royalties in the Satellite Era, in 5 INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE AND CABLE
TELEVISION RESOURCE MANUAL 86 (1987).
4. See Leahy, How to Protect Copyright in World Markets, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1988,
at A31, col. 2.
5. See Bollier, U.S. to Upgrade Standing in World Copyright Community-Finally,
CHANNELS, Sept. 1988, at 22.
6. See id. Sales losses from piracy seriously diminish market values. See id.
7. See id. Many attempts have been made to resolve the problem, but it is difficult to
harness or confine this new technology. See id.

Published by SURFACE, 1989

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 6

170

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 16:169

nually, 8 but the cost in foreign sales lost is between six and eight
billion dollars. 9
Satellite footprints 10 have opened the door both to signal interception by foreign cable systems and retransmission without
permission from copyright owners. Enforcement of copyright treaties may be moot, because they expressly address hard copy and do
not apply to transmission of intellectual property via satellites, the
conduit through which this signal piracy most often occurs. 11 For
example, Canadian cable systems have intercepted American television signals carried by satellite or broadcast by border television
stations for domestic viewers and have then blatantly retransmitted them to Canadian viewers without compensating United States
copyright holders. 12 From the perspective of the United States television industry, electronic piracy lessens international demand for
its product and strongly affects economic remuneration. 13
In 1988, two historic developments occurred which had a direct bearing upon the longstanding signal piracy problem within
Canada. First, the United States entered into the ground breaking
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 14 Second, the
United States ratified the Berne Convention for the Protection of
8. See Copyright Office Seeks to Stem Foreign Losses, BROADCASTING, Oct. 8, 1984, at
81.
9. See id. at 82.
10. See generally UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PIRACY OF U.S. COPYRIGHTED
WORKS IN TEN SELECTED COUNTRIES: A REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE TO THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 3-4 (Aug. 1985) (Discussing problems
posed by piracy). Depending on power and positioning, a footprint can be as wide as a
continent or as narrow as a metropolitan area. It is the earth's surface on which a satellite
transmission can be received. See also Motion Picture Exporting Association of America,
Memorandum on the Uses of Satellite Technology 56-61 (1984) [hereinafter MPEAA Memo
on Satellites]. The size of a footprint is determined by environmental conditions, the receiving dish and the technical properties of the satellite. Id.
11. See The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised July 24, 1971, 33 U.N.T.S. 218 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also Universal
Copyright Convention, Dec. 6, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324 at 2732, 216 U.N.T.S.
132 [hereinafter UCC]; The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, opened for signature, May 21, 1974, art. I, reprinted
in 13 l.L.M. 1444, 1447 [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; see infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
12. See Foreign "Piracy" of TV Signals Stirs Concern, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at
Al, col. 6.
13. See id.
14. See Rowen, Canadian Pact Opens Way for Other Accords, Wash. Post, Jan. 10,
1988, at Fl, col. 1. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney signed the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement on January 2, 1988, and it went into effect at midnight
on December 31, 1988. See also Farnsworth, Wide Effect Seen from Trade Pact, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 1989, at 29, col. 6.
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Artistic and Literary Works. 16
This note will examine the Canadian piracy problem in light
of these recent developments. Next, it will analyze whether the
FTA and the Berne Convention can provide an adequate means of
preventing unauthorized retransmission of United States intellectual property in the future. Finally, this note will consider practicable alternatives, which would alleviate electronic piracy on a
global scale. This note will conclude that if a practicable remedy
can be enacted in Canada, then such a remedy could act as a
blueprint for global implementation.
II.

PIRACY OF COPYRIGHTED SIGNALS

Within the "global village," Canada is not only one of our closest neighbors, but also our leading trading partner. 16 We share a
common border and language, relative economic stability, and certain cultural similarities. This commonalty makes Canada a desirable testing ground for measures to solve the signal piracy
problem. 17
As the number one exporter of intellectual property, the
United States is the nation most seriously affected by signal piracy
and the unauthorized retransmission of copyrighted works. 1 s Although United States cable operators are compelled to remunerate
Canadian copyright holders for use of their works, 19 there has been
an evident lack of reciprocity regarding the protection of United
15. See Motion Picture Association of America, U.S. Accession to the Berne Convention 1 (1988). The United States acceded to the Berne Convention on November 3, 1988 and
officially became a member on March 1, 1989. See id.
16. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F5, col. 1. Canada takes twenty percent of United
States exports. The United States had $125 billion in bilateral merchandise trade with Canada in 1985, $108 billion in trade with Japan and $108 billion in trade with the European
Economic Community. See id.
17. Id. With such crucial similarities and with the proximity of the two nations, this is
a good place to begin implementing solutions. See id.
18. See Bollier, supra note 5, at 22.
19. See Copyright Act, § III, 17 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (1976). Section III of the Copyright Act
protects broadcast signals with the compulsory licensing system. The CRT collects royalties
for foreign copyright owners whenever their programs are retransmitted by United States
cable companies. United States copyright law remunerates Canadian copyright owners for
use of their works in the United States. Id. § 501(c). But see Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 124 (1983) [hereinafter Fairness Bill Hearing] (finding that under Canadian copyright
law, signal interception and retransmission of broadcast signals by cable companies was not
an infringement of copyrighted works carried by the signals. Canadian distribution of foreign and domestic copyrighted programming was legal without compensation).
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States copyrighted works in Canada. 2 ° Clearly, under United
States copyright law 21 and under the Communications Act of
193422 as amended by the Cable Communications Act of 1984,23
Canadian interception and retransmission of United States signals
is illegal and deprives copyright owners of their rights. 24 Prior to
the FTA, the Canadian government was not willing to address this
sensitive issue. 26
Signal piracy gives rise to four specific areas of concern in the
United States: unauthorized retransmission, tax disincentives disfavoring Canadian businesses that advertise on American border
stations, simultaneous retransmission in western time zones and
Canadian jurisdiction over United States network programming in
foreign libel suits. 26 This note will confine its analysis to the first
two issues.
20. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 27. Canadian copyright owners earned
approximately $1.25 million from United States retransmissions of their programming in
1986. See id. If CRT statutory rates increase, Canadian remuneration will increase. Id.
United States copyright owners are angry, because Canadian cable companies earn money
from their products without paying for them. Id. See also Canadian Copyright Problems
Focus of Hill Hearing, BROADCASTING, Nov. 21, 1983, at 54. Until recently, policy makers did
not address copyright liability for cable retransmission. Solution Evolving to Canadian
Copyright Problem, BROADCASTING, May 21, 1984, at 42. Other nations, aware of the situation between Canada and the United States may follow suit. See Fairness Bill Hearing,
supra note 19, at 22.
21. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Subject to §§ 107 through 118, owners of copyrights under this title have the exclusive rights to do and to authorize the following: in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.
22. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47

u.s.c. § 151) (1934).

23. See Communications Act of 1934, § 605, amended by Cable Communications Policy
Act 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 705 (1984)).
24. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982). When read with United
States copyright law provisions, § 605 has been regarded as "adequate implementing legislation" in the United States. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 32-3. See also
Copyright Act, § III, 17 U.S.C. § 50l(c). Under § IIl(b) of the Copyright Act, unauthorized
secondary transmission to the public of a first transmission of a work is an infringement and
subject to remedies provided in §§ 502-506, 509. Id. § IIl(b).
25. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19.
26. See generally National Association of Broadcasters, Broadcast Regulation '88: A
Mid-Year Report 186 (July 1988) [hereinafter NAB Report]. NBC is now being sued for
libel by the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, who recognizes it is easier to win libel suits in
Canada. See id. For an in-depth analysis of the western time zone problem, see W. Potts &
J. Dunstan, Creeping Cancom: Canadian Distribution of American Television Programming to Alaskan Cable Systems, 7 PACE L. REV. 127 (1986).
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Unauthorized Retransmission

Canada is the most heavily cabled nation in the "global village."27 Penetration is at seventy-five percent nationally. 28 Four
out of five homes are cable ready and three out of five subscribe. 29
Canada uses satellites to link together its cable systems and to extend service to virtually the entire population. 30 These satellites
can also be used to retransmit United States television signals obtained from terrestrial broadcasts, border broadcasts, or United
States satellite networks. 31
The first concern relates to Canada's unauthorized retransmission of United States copyrighted signals. Unauthorized retransmission was sanctioned by the Canadian government because of
high consumer demand for United States programming and subsidization for the developing cable industry. 32 Thus, Canadians believe that they are allowed to access signals of United States border stations and premium services. 33 For over three decades,
Canada ignored its obligation to United States copyright holders
by its evident approval of this piracy. 34 This policy has permitted
the Canadian cable industry to develop and thrive. 35
In relation to retransmission, a distinction must be made be27. See Broadcasters in Canada Told to Shape Up, BROADCASTING, July 21, 1986, at 42;
see also T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, CABLE COMMUNICATION (2d ed. 1988).
28. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 61.
29. Id. at 65. Canadian communities of one hundred residents or more implement local
broadcasting distribution systems.
30. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, Copyright and New Technology: The Case of Unauthorized Reception From Communications Satellites 4 (Feb. 15, 1985) (unpublished manuscript from lecture given at Vancouver). Point-to-point communication is a direct link between a transmitting earth station and receiving station and the signal is weak. In point to
multi-point, satellites distribute signals to cable head-ends and local television stations for
network broadcasting. The signal is stronger. A direct broadcast satellite has the strongest
signal and it transmits it for direct reception. See id.
31. See id.
32. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 366.
33. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES
IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES 43 (1984).
34. See P. Grant, Free Trade and the Retransmission of Program Signals: New Developments in Program Rights, Payment and Protection in Canada Dl (Mar. 25, 1988) (notes
for presentation to the Law Society of Upper Canada Conference on Canadian Communications Law and Policy).
35. See id. Peter Grant, a Canadian communications law attorney, has said:
In 1954, when the Exchequer Court of Canada ruled, simultaneous rediffusion of
broadcast signals to private homes did not constitute a radio communication to the
public or a performance in public, the cable industry has since operated under an
umbrella of immunity from copyright infringement.
Id.
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tween local and distant broadcast signals. 36 Because the majority
of the Canadian population lives along the United States-Canadian
border, it has the capacity to receive United States programming
from off-air local signals. 37 Generally, retransmission of local, conventional off-air, broadcast signals is not piracy so long as the signals remain intact and are not delayed. 38 Both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Canadian RadioTelevision and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) use the
Grade "B" contour, the official contour used for television stations,
to determine a local signal. 39 This contour establishes the area in
which there is acceptable reception fifty percent of the time at the
best fifty percent of receiving locations:' 0 Because of this local signal definition, implementation of the FTA cannot act alone in
resolving the border broadcaster problem. 41 Royalty payments may
only accrue to retransmission of distant, conventional broadcast
signals. 42
Piracy occurs when Canadian satellite carriers intercept
United States border television signals and then retransmit them
by point to multi-point distribution. 43 This method facilitates
broad distribution. 44 With government approval, Canadian Satellite Communications, Inc. (CANCOM), Canada's national satellite
service, has distributed United States broadcast signals without
compensating appropriate networks, affiliates, or copyright owners
for use of the copyrighted programming contained in them. ~ Ini4

36. See id. at D8. Distant signals are outside the B contour and are subject to royalty
payments. Local signals are within the B contour, and may be received off-air. See also
NAB Report, supra note 26, at 206. Piracy and redistribution of United States border signals are also accomplished by terrestrial microwave. Deletion of United States commercials
and other alterations occur in some instances. See id.
37. See Cooke, Introduction, in CULTURES IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S.
BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 33, at xi.
38. P. Grant, supra note 34, at D8. In the U.S., signals are exempt if retransmitted by
cable systems to subscribers in the local service area of primary transmitters. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Letter from Smith, Lyons, Torrance, Stevenson & Mayer to Hillel Gedrich,
MPEAA Deputy Director Legal Affairs 2 (Oct. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Gedrich Letter] (stating that economic hardships of local signal definition increase).
42. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at D8.
43. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 182; see also P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 3.
44. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 3.
45. See Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 144-45. Canadian cable systems such
as CANCOM intercepted U.S. broadcast signals for distribution to Canadian viewers, and
U.S. copyright owners were not remunerated. See also NAB Report, supra note 26.
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tially, such retransmission was only to remote areas where off-air
reception was poor; however, urban centers were soon included. 46
CANCOM sells these signals, offering "3 plus 1" service (the
for profit distribution of ABC, CBC, NBC, and PBS affiliates' pirated signals) to the entire Canadian cable network."' Canadian
cable systems pay a fee to CANCOM, but they have neither been
liable for retransmission poached from United States domestic satellite transmissions nor for retransmission from United States network border affiliates." 8 Copyrights of border broadcasters have
been violated along the entire breadth of the United States-Canada border from Bellingham, Washington, to Presque Isle, Maine,
and United States "super stations" have also been retransmitted
without consent. 49
Commercial and premium channels use satellites to transmit
television signals to cable system "headends" for redistribution. 50
These signals are also susceptible to unauthorized reception by individuals, hotels, and apartment complexes having a satellite dish
of comparable size to the cable headend dishes. 51 This technology
resulted in widespread unauthorized reception of competing signals carrying programming, including Home Box Office, ESPN,
and the Arts & Entertainment Network, on United States communication satellites. 52 In 1984, approximately seventy-eight thousand
apartment suites in Canada received these signals through satellite
master antenna television (MATV) even though copyright holders
were never compensated. 53
By 1988, most United States premium signals were encrypted
and could no longer be poached by satellite dish owners who were
consequently forced to pay for reception. 54 For a brief time pre46. See id.
47. See Address by M. Berg, Senior Associate General Counsel with the NAB, House of
Commons (June 21, 1985)(opening statement to the Subcommittee on the Revision of Copyright of the Standing Committee on Communications and Culture) [hereinafter Berg Address]; see also The Canadian Copyright Problem, BROADCASTING, May 21, 1984, at 42.
48. See Motion Picture Export Association of America, Memorandum on Canadian
Trade Barriers § 2, ii 8 (May 1988).
49. See Berg Address, supra note 47.
50. See T . BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 9 (a headend is the control center at
which all program sources are received, assembled and processed for transmission by the
cable distribution network); see also 17 U.S.C. § lll(f) (1982) (definition of cable system);
see generally M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE (1979).
51. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 4.
52. See id. at 1, 2; see also T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 333.
53. See P. Grant & G. Westcott, supra note 30, at 2.
54. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvov, supra note 27, at 333.
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mium signals were secure, because decoders were needed to unscramble them. By 1987, however, a covert industry in the manufacture and sale of contraband decoders had become operative. 55
This industry manages to keep pace with changes in the encryption system and is almost impossible to police.
Illegal decoders are as sophisticated as the technology they decode. 56 Paradoxically, they can be purchased in the United States
for about twenty dollars. The circuitry is modified and then sold
for 300 dollars in Canada where approximately eighty thousand illegal decoders are now in use. 57 These illegal devices cost Canadian
cable operators fifty million dollars in lost revenue in 1988, 58 not to
mention the loss to United States premium services.
United States premium services cannot approve decoders for
their services in Canada, because they rarely acquire Canadian
programming pay television rights.H Furthermore, under CRTC license regulation, Canadian premium services must contribute substantially to Canadian program development even though their
services are unmarketable to television receive-only (TVRO) dish
owners, who illegally intercept United States premium services. 60
The Canadian Criminal Code supports encryption and should, to
some measure, discourage signal piracy; however, the wide interpretations by lower courts make prosecution uncertain. 61
B.

Canadian Income Tax Legislation

The second area of United States concern involves the use of
Canadian income tax legislation as a deterrent to Canadian advertising on United States border broadcasting stations. 62 In 1971, the
CRTC implemented a policy permitting cable licensees to delete
commercials from signals of television statio~s not licensed to pro55. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dll. Increasing numbers of "walking descramblers"
are imported into Canada by people using an illegal United States mail drop. Id.
56. See GI to Revamp Videocipher II, BROADCASTING, Sept. 5, 1988 at 89. General Instruments estimates that 319,000 of the 1,012,000 VCils shipped have been altered to allow
unauthorized reception of satellite-delivered television programming. Id.
57. See Byrne, West Coast Cable-TV Companies Banding Together to Battle Pirates,
Globe & Mail, Nov. 2, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
58. See id.
59. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dll.
60. See id. The Canadian courts are reluctant to prosecute these pirates. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES
IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 33, at
47.
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vide service in Canada. 68 The goal was to encourage Canadian advertising on Canadian programming and to discourage expenditure
of Canadian advertising dollars on American border stations if the
same Canadian target audience could be reached through commercial deletion. 64 This policy was originally implemented in Calgary
and Edmonton, but by 1973 was occurring randomly in the Toronto market.H Angry American border broadcasters unsuccessfully challenged this practice in the Canadian courts. 66 By 1977,
the CRTC suspended the policy, because it was recognized as an
ineffective, costly and inappropriate stimulus for advertising on local Canadian programming. 67 Commercial deletion is only permitted in the Calgary and Edmonton markets and has been
grandfathered by the FTA. 68
Equally problematic for American border broadcasters is Bill
C-58, which amends the Canadian Income Tax Act. 69 This corporate tax provision, which denies business tax deductions to Canadian advertisers on American border stations and was enacted to
bolster the Canadian broadcast industry as part of Canadian culture, makes the cost of advertising on American stations one hundred percent higher than it is on Canadian stations. 70 Once again
the Canadian government's goal was to stimulate increased spending on domestic productions which would, in turn, seduce Canadian viewing audiences back to Canadian-content programming. 71
A secondary motive was to reduce the outflow of Canadian dollars
to the American market. 72 This amendment is both effective and
63. See id.
64. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, Bilateral Cultural Free Trade: The U.S.-Canadian
Case 8 (1988) (unpublished manuscript available at Simon Fraser University).
,65. See generally Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in
CULTURES IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra
note 33, at 47.
66. See Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. CRTC, 2 S.C.R. 141 (1981).
67. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES
IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note 33, at
48.
68. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-449, 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1851.
69. Bill C-58, An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, April 18, 1975. "In computing
income, no deduction shall be made in respect of any otherwise deductible outlay or expense
of a taxpayer made or incurred after the sanction comes into force, for an advertisement
directed primarily to a market in Canada and broadcast by a foreign broadcast undertaking." Id.
70. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 69.
71. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, supra note 64, at 9.
72. See id.
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strictly enforced. 78 However, the government's primary goal has
not been achieved, because there is no compulsion or incentive for
Canadian-owned media to spend resulting windfall profits on the
production of Canadian content programming. 74
Moreover, Canadian border stations are hard pressed to turn a
profit in view of the competition from American border stations,
the greater interest of Canadian audiences in American programming and the lack of American interest in Canadian programming. 75 Instead, they have used those windfall profits to underwrite operating expenses. 76 As a result, the cost to American border
stations is as high as twenty million dollars annually in lost advertising revenues. 77
Numerous negotiations between the United States and Canada on the easing of C-58 have failed to yield an agreement. As a
result of the failure of these initiatives, the United States government was finally compelled to introduce mirror legislation. 78 Moreover, during the 1985 Shamrock Summit, C-58 was a topic of discussion between former President Ronald Reagan and Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney. 79 Finally, United States trade representatives again raised the issue during FTA negotiations. Except in
relation to the printing industry, American negotiators have been
unable to move Canadian negotiators from their intransigence on
this issue. 80 The prospect for repeal of C-58 in relation to American border stations looks bleak; the Canadian position has not altered since its initial implementation and appears to be as firm as
it is in relation to the culture exemption.

C.

The Canadian Cultural Incentive

In the information age, intellectual property industries are the
73. See Law & Regulation, BROADCASTING, at 66-68 (Jan. 30, 1984). Border broadcasters
suffered a fifty percent loss in Canadian business, because cost of advertising for Canadians
almost doubled according to this Canadian study. Bill C-58 generated in excess of $28 million in revenues for Canadian broadcasters in 1982. See also Chapter IV: Programming and
Advertising Issues, NAB Report, supra note 26, at 67.
74. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, supra note 64, at 9.
75. Telephone interview with Robert Tritt, Director of Trade Policy and Canada/USA
Telecommunications, Canadian Department of Communications, Canada (Jan. 23, 1989)
[hereinafter Tritt Interview].
76. See id.
77. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 69.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 277-81.
79. See P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dl.
80. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 68; see also Bill C-58, supra note 69.
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principal conduits for the exchange of ideas; through these industries, a nation produces and disseminates the cultural products,
which mold and reflect its society. Canadians are heavy cultural
product consumers, even though those products are essentially
American in origin. 81 Canada believes that it should seek a more
equal balance between Canadian and foreign perspectives. 82 As
Former Communications Minister Flora MacDonald stated, "culture is the very essence of our national identity. Nourishing that
identity are the cultural industries, whose institutions ... face long
odds against success. We want to shorten those odds."83 The cultural sector generates in excess of ten billlion dollars in the Canadian economy and employs over three hundred thousand. 8 "
Currently, CRTC regulation in broadcasting places national
content viewing at thirty percent. Nonetheless, the actual share of
audience captured is much lower because of the higher interest in
American programming. 85 The American market is approximately
ten times greater, because it is possible to reach eighty percent of
the Canadian population by cable television whereas cable penetration in the United States is about fifty-three percent. 86 The distinction between these percentages becomes even more graphic
when the size of the Canadian population is compared to the size
81. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 1. Seventy-six percent of all books are imported;
ninety-seven percent of films shown are also imported; over ninety percent of dramatic television is foreign; eighty-nine percent of revenue from the sound-recording industry accrues
to twelve foreign controlled firms. See id.
82. Id.
83. See VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 5; see also Rewriting the Communications Rules
in Canada, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1989, at 102 [hereinafter Rewriting the Rules]. In the
policy paper, "Canadian Voices: Canadian Choices," which describes the new Canadian
broadcasting policy, Ms. MacDonald asserted:
It is of fundamental importance to our political and cultural sovereignty that our
broadcasting system be an accurate reflection of who we are, of how we behave, of
how we view the world. It plays a major role i~ defining our national, regional, local,
and even our individual identities. It is, therefore, much more than just another
industry.
Rewriting the Rules, supra, at 102.
84. Canada-U.S . Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, COMMONS DEBATES,
16,892 (June 28, 1988) (address by Flora MacDonald, former Minister of Communications,
before debate on Bill C-130, which was enacted as C-2, the copyright implementing legislation). See Rewriting the Rules, supra note 83, at 103.
85. See Rewriting the Rules, supra note 83, at 103; see also Parker, The Free-Trade
Challenge, CAN. F., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 34. The CRTC requires sixty percent daytime and
fifty percent prime time Canadian programming from television "stations, but reports that
less than ten percent of prime time English language programming is Canadian. See Parker,
supra, at 34.
86. See Parker, supra note 85, at 34.
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of the American populatfon. 87
Some commentators have gone so far as to refer to post-industrial Canada as a developing nation in cultural terms, thereby excusing its protectionist attitude. 88 Because pirated American television signals have subsidized the Canadian cable industry with
Canadian government approval, Canada cannot claim to be protecting its culture when, for example, over ninety percent of dramatic television programming is foreign and, of that percentage,
seventy-five percent is of American origin. 89 Simply put, this is a
question of economics. 9 ° Canadian producers cannot financially
compete in the market place with the negligible cost of American
programming, especially when that programming is abstracted at
no cost to Canadian cable systems who retransmit it. 91 Furthermore, even when Canadian broadcasters purchase American programming, the rates are much lower than those of the Canadian
cultural producers. 92
The economics of program production are linked to the sale of
advertising. 93 Because American programming has greater appeal,
it generates higher advertising revenues. 94 The combination of the
relatively small Canadian market and the fierce competition for
American programming in export markets makes production of
Canadian programs a high risk. 96 The government sought to
87. See Defining the Accord, MACLEANS, Nov. 21, 1988, at FT6. There are 246 million
American citizens and only 26 million Canadian citizens. Id.
88. Address by Ambassador Simon Reisman, Canadian Television and Film Association
(June 17, 1988) [hereinafter Reisman Address]. Reisman said:
[Film] and television were never the subject of negotiations at my negotiating table.
. . . This is also true for the cultural industries generally . . . . Canada was not
prepared to enter into any substantive commitment that would in any way limit our
freedom to do whatever we considered necessary to further the interests of our cultural industries and to advance our national goals in the realm of cultural activity
broadly defined. The U.S. side ... [g]ot nowhere and in the end came to accept it
even though ... [t]hey don't really understand the reasons for it.
Id.
89. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 5.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 63. Imported programming is available at five to ten percent of the cost
for similar quality Canadian programming. See also Rewriting the Rules, supra note 83, at
103. Canadian broadcasting rights to one hour of Dallas cost $60,000. One hour of original
Canadian programming can cost almost $1 million to produce. In 1984, Canadians spent
ninety-eight percent of tQ.eir viewing time watching foreign dramatic programs despite the
thirty percent CRTC rule. Id.
93. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 59.
94. See id. at 60.
95. See id.
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strengthen the economic base for Canadian broadcasting with Bill
C-58, 96 which did repatriate Canadian advertising expenditures
from American border broadcasters. However, this did not achieve
the goal of increased spending on Canadian programming
development. 97

III.

THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

The present volume of trade and investment between the
United States and Canada is the largest of any two nations in the
world. 98 Eighty percent of all Canadian trade is conducted with the
United States. 99 More than half of the capital in Canada is foreignowned with United States investment comprising a substantial
portion of that figure. 10° Furthermore, Canada is the single largest
importer of United States intellectual property. 101
Canada and the United States exchanged goods and services
in excess of 160 billion dollars in value in 1987; this figure is expected to rise as a result of the FTA. 102 Following Congressional
and Parliamentary approval, the FTA, signed by former President
Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1988, came
into force on January 1, 1989. 108 A joint Canada-United States
trade commission was established to monitor its
implementation. 10"
Under the FTA, elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers
over a ten year period will enhance both nations competitiveness
on an international scale by increasing mutual economic growth,
lowering prices, and expanding employment. 106 Unless terminated
by either nation upon six months notice, the FTA will remain in
place indefinitely. However, the agreement may be amended at any
96. See id. at 61; see also Bill C-58, An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, April 18,
1975.
97. See S. Globerman & A. Vining, supra note 64, at 9.
98. See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, DEP'T ST. BuLL., July 1988, at 24 [hereinafter Free Trade Agreement].
99. See id.
100. See Parker, supra note 2, at 29.
101. See id.
102. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98, at 24.
103. See Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 29.
104. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98, at 24. There will be a secretariat in
Ottawa and Washington, D.C., which will be the principal government office responsible for
implementation. Article 103 obligates Canada to ensure provincial laws and changes will be
made. See id.
105. See id.
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time by mutual consent. 106 The FTA is the most comprehensive
bilateral trade accord ever entered into by the United States 107
and its provisions are consistent with the obligations of both nations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 108 As such, the FTA establishes precedents for similar negotiations with other nations and promotes global trade
liberalization. 109
Although the agreement covers most areas of trade, it grants
specific exemption to Canadian cultural industries including
broadcasting, film, and publishing. 110 The Canadian cultural industries, like Bill C-58, proved to be a non-negotiable issue during the
trade talks. m Nevertheless, if the cultural exemption restrains
trade, either nation has a "right to redress" under the "notwithstanding" clause of the FTA and may institute reciprocal commercial measures without resorting to arbitration in the binational
commission empowered to resolve disputes. 112
There are four express exceptions within the cultural exemption.m The first eliminates tariffs on cultural goods such as cassettes, film, and records. 114 The second relates to Canadian investment policies, stating that "[a]ny requirement to sell a foreignowned cultural enterprise acquired directly by a United States citizen will be balanced by an offer to purchase the enterprise from
the United States investor at fair open market value, as deter106. See id.
107. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1. The U.S. has a two year-old free trade
agreement with Israel, and trade experts speculate there may be one soon with Japan or
Taiwan. See id.
108. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98, at 24, 25. The FTA reaffirms the
GATT principle preventing discrimination against imported goods. Id. at 25.
109. See id. The United States and Canada are promoting the inclusion of goods and
services in the GATT system. See id. at 24.
110. See Bow to Culture, MACLEANS, supra note 87, at FT21 [hereinafter Bow to
Culture].
111. See Reisman Address, supra note 88.
112. Grant, Canadian Communications Law and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 6 COMM. LAW. 8 (1988). The "notwithstanding clause" states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a party may take measures
of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for [the cultural industries exemption].
Id.
113. See International Trade Commission Group, Department of External Affairs, The
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, ch. 20, art. 2005, at 292 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement]. The two governments agreed that with four limited
exceptions nothing in the FTA affects the ability of either to follow its cultural policies. Id.
114. See id. ch. 4, art. 401, at 49.
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mined by an independent, impartial assessment."m Under the
third exception, both nations will provide copyright protection to
owners of programs broadcast by distant stations and retransmitted by cable companies. 116 Furthermore, Canada must amend its
Copyright Act, providing a retransmission right for copyright owners on a nondiscriminatory basis. 117 Once Canadian copyright legislation is implemented, both nations will have the opportunity to
review outstanding issues. 118
The fourth exception obligates Canada to repeal the section of
C-58 that requires that publications be typeset and printed in Canada so that Canadian advertisers may qualify for tax deductions. 119
Thus, Canadian businesses may deduct advertising expenses for
periodicals printed in the United States, but only if they meet Canadian content rules and are owned by Canadians. 120
A.

United States and Canadian Copyright Law

Because the United States is currently the most prolific exporter of intellectual property, 121 domestic copyright law developed
to fulfill the needs of United States copyright owners. 122 Domestic
copyright law did not evolve in this manner in other nations, because fewer commercially popular exports have been produced and
comprehensive copyright protection has not been as critical. 123 For
instance, domestic copyright protection is accomplished in Canada
by the copyright statute and the CRTC. 124 Prior to the FTA, Canada's copyright statute did not give copyright protection to cable
or satellite retransmissions of distant signals. 126 Further, unautho115. See id. ch. 16, art. 1607, ii 4 at 237, 238.
116. See id. ch. 20, art. 2006, at 297, 298.
117. Id.
118. See id. art. 2006(1) at 297.
119. See id. art. 2007, at 299. Canada must repeal printing provisions in § 19(5) of the
Income Tax Act (amended by Bill C-58, which extended to broadcasters and eliminated an
exemption for Time and Reader's Digest). The FTA did not change the requirement that
seventy-five percent of the publication be owned by Canadians and that it be edited and
published by Canadian residents. Id.
120. See Bow to Culture, supra note 110, at FT21.
121. Fairness Bill Hearing, supra note 19, at 27. "In the telecommunications
field-particularly program production-the United States is already the largest copyright
exporting state." Id. at 17, 18.
122. See id.
123. See e.g., id. at 19-22 (comparison of Canadian and United States copyright law).
See also MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 56-61.
124. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30 § 1 (1985); MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra
note 10, at 56.
.
125. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30, § 1; see MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note
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rized interception of satellite signals and cable television programming is not addressed in CRTC regulations. 126
Under the 1976 United States Copyright Act and through FCC
authorization, a cable system's retransmission of a copyrighted
program is considered to be a public performance. 127 The rights of
copyright proprietors, who have financial interests in cable redistribution of their works, are limited by the compulsory licensing
system established in the 1976 Copyright Act and administered by
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT). 128 Under this system,
United States cable companies can legally redistribute intellectual
property so long as they follow the fee schedule established by the
CRT.12e
The CRT is comprised of five presidentially-appointed commissioners who serve seven year terms. 130 Their responsibilities include the adjustment of royalty rates and the distribution of royalties to copyright owners after a deduction for administrative
costs. 131 As of 1980, royalty rates were to be reevaluated every five
years. 132 If copyright holders have claims regarding non-network
retransmission of their works, they may file individual or joint
claims with the CRT. 133 The CRT guarantees that copyright holders are properly compensated for each use of their copyrighted
work by a United States cable system. 134 In addition to the compulsory licensing system, the United States also utilizes voluntary
licensing. 136 Under the voluntary licensing system, cable operators
may negotiate directly with program owners for the use of program
carrying signals, including the cable satellite channels of ESPN,
Home Box Office and the USA Network. Compulsory licensing is
10, at 56.
126. MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 56.
127. But see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8-196-97 (1984). "Perform" in the
1976 Copyright Act does not adequately encompass retransmission and may not give affirmative statutory protection to copyright owners in secondary transmissions. See id.
128. 17 U.S.C. § III(c)-(d)(2).
129. Id.
130. See T. BALDWIN & D. Mcvoy, supra note 27, at 188.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. 17 u.s.c. § 801(b)(3).
134. Id.
135. See Wolfe, Ruling May Bring Down Cable's Copyright Costs, CABLEVISION, Aug.
18, 1986, at 57; see also In re Compulsory Copyright License for Cable Retransmission, S.
Doc. No. 87 FCC, 2 F.C.C. Red. 2387 (1987). Cable systems may negotiate directly with
copyright owners for retransmission rights, a more costly system allowing the market to
reflect the value of the copyrighted signals. See id.
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more common. 136
Although compulsory licensing is binding on domestic cable
companies, it is not binding on foreign cable systems, because
United States copyright laws do not have extraterritorial jurisdiction.137 Resale common carriers are not subject to copyright liability by virtue of FCC authorization. 138 When the FCC ruled that
resale ·common carriers could distribute television signals to global
markets, it stated that "all individuals are expected to comply with
all copyright laws and other program requirements. " 139 The FCC
further stated that "the proper forum to raise [copyright] issues
would be the transborder locations where the programming is received. "1•o This raises the issue of international copyright enforcement, and enforcement is dependent upon international copyright
laws. 1•1
B.

The FTA Retransmission Exception

Of the four exceptions to the cultural exemption under the
FTA, the retransmission exception is perhaps the most influential.
The short term benefit is that it compels Canadian broadcasters
and cable systems to pay for use of intellectual property.u 2 The
136. See Compulsory License, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1989, at 18. The FCC voted in
1988 to recommend that Congress abolish the compulsory copyright licenses for distant signals. See also FCC Wants Congress to Dump Compulsory Licenses, BROADCASTING, Oct. 31,
1988, at 30.
137. See M. NIMMER, supra note 127, § 17 .02, at 17-5. See also Kirios, Territoriality
and International Copyright Infringement Actions, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 53
(1972).
138. See M. NIMMER, supra note 127; see also 47 U.S.C. §214(a). Under the Communications Act, the FCC has jurisdiction over common carrier operations. The FCC authorized
resale technology as a common carrier communications service when it granted the request
of Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., to operate as a common carrier. Southern Satellite Sys.,
Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976). Evaluating the request under the "public interest standard,"
the FCC said:
Among the many benefits we foresaw from an open entry policy for resale carriers
was the more efficient utilization of existing communication capacity. This appears
to be a particular benefit here since SSS's proposal will permit a more efficient utilization of high capacity domestic facilities by carriers with a special expertise in
certain communications submarkets .... [It] would also result in an increase in the
diversity of cable television programming available to the public....
Id. at 159-60.
139. Eastern Microwave, Inc., I-P-C-81-049 et al., Mimeo No. 2617, at 37 released Mar.
1, 1983.
140. Id.
141. See id. Because of U.S. ratification of the Berne Convention, it may be easier to
seek redress provided by the minimum standard rule. See Berne Convention, supra note 11.
142. Additional net outflow to the United States from retransmission royalties is esti-
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long term benefit is that Canada is required to update its copyright
law in order to implement the retransmission right promised by
the FTA. 143 The ramifications of this revision could affect all foreign intellectual property and ultimately provide compensation to
foreign copyright holders under the aegis of "national
treatment. " 14"
Amendments to Canada's Copyright Act, which implement the
FTA, make unauthorized cable or satellite retransmission of copyrighted works to the public a liability. 146 Under this cultural exception, copyright owners receive royalties if retransmission of a distant broadcast signal is unaltered and simultaneous. 1" 6 If the
retransmission is of a local broadcast signal, no remuneration is
required. 147 Negotiated consent of the copyright owner is needed
for any other communication to the public. 148 For the first time,
Canadian cable systems will be required to pay royalties for retransmitting the distant broadcast signals of United States premium services and border stations. 149

C. Bill C-2
Bill C-2 implements the FTA. 160 Proclaimed into force by Parliament on February 19, 1989, the bill creates a compulsory licensing scheme for distant signal transmissions, as well as a copyright
royalty tribunal, which establishes the royalty rate. m The bill further provides that distant signals are to be defined by CRTC regulation.152 In confidential negotiations prior to FTA passage, Canamated to be in the 100 million dollar range annually. Parker, supra note 85, at 33.
143. See id.
144. See National Treatment, MACLEANS, Nov. 21, 1988, at FT7. National treatment is
a GATT concept that bars discrimination against the goods of other nations. In the FTA,
both nations agreed not to impose higher internal taxes, more stringent laws, or rigorous
regulations on foreign goods than on domestic goods. See id.
145. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, § 2006(2) at 297.
146. Id. § 2006(2)(b).
147. Id. § 2006(3)(a)(ii)(B) at 298.
148. Id. § 2006(2)(a) at 297.
149. Id.
150. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-36-37 Elizabeth II (1988). C-130 was enacted on February 13,
1989 as C-2. C-130 includes the amendments that revise the Canada Copyright Act and
implements Article 2006. See id. See also Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30 §§ 2 ii 3(1)(f), 3(1),
28, 48, 50.6 (1985), amended by R.S.C., ch. C-42 (Supp. 4 1988).
151. See Retransmission Regulations Adopted by Cabinet, COMM. FACT SHEET No. 893802 E (May 9, 1989) [hereinafter Retransmission Regulations]; see also Grant, supra note
112.
152. Id.
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dian negotiators assured United States negotiators that the
definition would be within the grade B contour. 163 Nevertheless,
the definition of local signal was determined as B contour plus
32Km. 154 This addition is viewed as arising from Canadian Cable
Television Association pressure and its claim that this definition
resembles the United States local signal definition. 1 H The effect is
to severely reduce the number of so-called distant signals, especially in the Ontario market, and the amount of royalties, originally estimated at between 9.1 and 11.2 million dollars, which
would be generated for United States intellectual property
industries. 156
B contour plus 32Km does not simulate the United States system because the two broadcasting systems are so diverse, especially
in relation to the border significance. 157 The United States definition does not recognize the border. However, Canadian signals are
not viewed heavily by American consumers. 158 On the other hand,
ninety percent of the programming watched by Canadian consumers is American. 159 According to Robert Tritt, a director of the Canadian Department of Communications, the 32Km spill-over from
the B contour was appended to the local signal definition in order
to arrive at an equitable definition of distant signal. 16° Canada's
153. See Gedrich Letter, supra note 41.
154. See Retransmission Regulations, supra note 151, at 3. A signal is considered local
and exempt from royalty payments when it completely covers a cable system's service area.
See id. When the coverage is partial, the cable system must pay royalties for coverage of the
distant part of the service area. See id.
155. See Gedrich Letter, supra note 41.
156. Sue-COMMITIEE ON THE REVISION OF COPYRIGHT, STANDING CoMMITIEE ON COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE, A CHARTER OF RIGHTS FoR CREATORS 1, 43 (1985). These figures
represent 1.4% to 1.7% of revenues of cable systems for 1985.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 501(c). American copyright owners believe a border should not be a
determinant when their works are retransmitted without authorization. Transborder spill
over does not release Canadian abstracters from responsibility, especially when Canadian
copyright owners are compensated by United States broadcasters for retransmission of Canadian copyrighted works. See id.
158. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75.
159. VITAL LINKS, supra note 1, at 62.
160. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75; see also Retransmission Regulations, supra
note 151, at 3. By legislation, the Canadian Copyright Board ensures a preferred rate for
small retransmission systems, which are located in isolated or remote areas and serve one
thousand households or less. Id. Legislation, defining local and distant signal and small retransmission systems, became effective on May 9, 1989. Id. at 1. Cabinet approval of these
regulations was announced by Canadian Communications Minister Marcel Masse. See Retransmission Rights, Communications News Release No. 89-5292E 1 (May 9, 1989); see generally Letter from Norman Altermann, MPEAA Vice President of Legal Affairs, to Kenneth
Hepburn, Assistant Deputy Minister, Canadian Department of Communications (April 7,
1989). Mr. Altermann suggested implementation of the following regulation defining small
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perception of this issue is that United States concern about the
addition of 32Km is based upon loss of the coveted Ontario
market. 161
1.

Compulsory Licensing

Within C-2, the compulsory licensing scheme is specifically
limited to simultaneous retransmission, but there are two conditions wherein a copyright owner's authorization must be obtained. 162 The first is where the intent of the original transmission
was not for the general public ~ 163 In this instance, a cable system
would be compelled to contract directly with the rights holder. 164
Encrypted premium satellite services such as Home Box Office and
the Arts & Entertainment Channel, which are for cabled homes, fit
this classification. 165 United States treatment is similar under the
1976 United States Copyright Act. 166 The second condition concerns retransmissions of conventional broadcast signals that are intentionally delayed or retransmitted in a changed format. 167 Further, there are exceptions to these conditions. 168 As of January 1,
1990, Canadian cable systems will begin paying royalties. 169
retransmission systems for the purpose of subsection 70.64(1) of the Copyright Act as enacted by S.C. 1988, c. 65, s. 63:
Small retransmission systems mean cable retransmission systems (other than
master antenna systems) and terrestrial retransmission systems utilizing Hertzian
waves that retransmit a signal, with or without a fee, to no more than 1,000 premises in the same community.
Id.
161. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75.
162. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, art. 2006(2).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, § lll(b). This section
excludes secondary transmission of a primary transmission when controlled and limited to
reception by particular members of the public, such as MUZAK and premium TV signals.
Under compulsory license, signals may not be altered by the retransmitter. See id.
167. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, art. 2006. Exceptions include blackouts; programs distributed by local network affiliates, transmission of obscene or
abusive material, transmission during an election, public service announcements,
grandfathering of commercial deletion in Calgary and Edmonton and retransmission to remote areas where simultaneous reception is impractical. Id . art. 2006(3)(a). A local licensee
must be allowed to exploit the full commercial value of his license. Id. art. 2006(3)(b).
168. See id.
169. Background Note, Provisions Affecting the Cultural Industries in the CanadaUnited States Trade Agreement 4 (Jan. 1988). The Regime will apply to retransmission of
Canadian and United States broadcast signals on a non-discriminatory basis. See id. See
also O'Neil, Cable and Copyright in Canada: The New Retransmission Right Environment,
CABLE COMM. MAG., June 1989, at 14. The projected cost in royalties to the Canadian cable
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In the United States, compulsory licenses apply to distant Canadian signal carriage carried by United States cable systems located within 150 miles of the border or north of the forty-second
parallel. 170 Under that scheme, cable systems in, for example,
Cleveland, Detroit and Seattle would fall under the compulsory licensing scheme. Chicago, New York City and San Francisco would
not. 171 Since the majority of the Canadian population is located
within 150 miles of the border, it would be considered discriminatory for more distant Canadian cable subscribers not to enjoy the
benefits of the compulsory · license approach for United States
broadcast signals. 172 This perceived inequity became the foundation for the 32Km addition to the distant signal definition. 173
Bill C-2 repeals section 3(1)(f) of the Canadian Copyright
Act.m C-2 addresses MATV systems, which serve multiple unit
dwellings. m Individuals who occupy units in the same building are
considered part of the public, and therefore, are entitled to receive
a communication exclusively intended for transmission to that entity.176 Section 1.3 defines a telecommunications carrier as one who
merely provides the technology needed by another entity to communicate a work to the public. 177 This amendment parallels the
"passive carrier" exemption in the 1976 United States Copyright
Act. 178 As a result of the "passive carrier" rule, United States resale carriers, or "superstations," that uplink conventional television station signals to transponders, which deliver them to cable
systems, are not infringing upon copyrighted works because they
do not alter the signal. 179 In Canada, CANCOM controls both the
industry is from 15 to 20 million dollars annually. See id.
170. P. Grant, supra note 34, at 06.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Tritt Interview, supra, note 75.
174. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-36-37, 11 62(1) at 46 (enacted as C-2). See also id. § (f).
175. Id. 11 62(2)(1.2).
176. Id. See O'Neil, supra note 169, at 15. Under narrow interpretation of the Canadian
government's definition, urban MATV systems qualify as small retransmission systems and
are entitled to the preferential royalty rate; however, MATV systems in urban service areas
of cable licensees serving more than one thousand premises were excluded by an amendment to the definition. Such systems are classified as equivalent to cable systems in whose
areas they operate. See id.
177. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-36-37, 11 62(2)(1.2) (enacted as C-2).
178. Id.
179. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § lll(a)(3). This is the "passive carrier" exemption
where
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selection and the use of signals it transmits; it would not be considered a resale carrier by United States definition. 180 Nonetheless,
it would be exempt from liability under the Canadian Copyright
Act, because CANCOM cable affiliates are responsible for remitting royalty payments for use of program signals 181 and also for
fees payable to CANCOM as the resale carrier. 182
2.

Retransmission

The implementing legislation also includes a section on retransmission. 183 That section specifically defines a distant and local
signal, a retransmitter and signal and retransmission of local signals. 184 Furthermore, by repealing section 48.52 following subsection (4), it grants the Copyright Appeals Board the right to establish parameters for the application for royalty rates for distant
signals. 186
Section 66.52 substitutes section 48.52 and addresses the functhe secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or indirect
control over the content or selection of the primary transmission or over the particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose activities with respect to
the secondary transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of others ....
Id.

180. See id. See also Copyright Update, 13 CABLE COMMUNIQUE 1, 4 (1989). The CRTC
has authorized four United States "superstations," WTBS, WPIX, WOR and WGN, for
cable system carriage in Canada, but these signals cannot be exported because of a United
States State Department embargo which will be in place until retransmission royalties are
established and are being paid. Once this is in process, the United States government will
authorize United States common carriers to export the "superstation" signals. See id.
181. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-37, ii 62(2)(1.3)(1.4) (enacted as C-2).
182. Id. But see Brotman, Cable Television and Copyright: Legislation and the Marketplace Model, 2 COMM/ENT 477, 481 (1979-80). In the United States, resale common carriers are paid a monthly fee by cable companies receiving the forwarded television signals,
and fees are based on the companies' average number of monthly subscribers.
183. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2d Sess., §§ 35-37, ii 63 (amending § 28 with § 28.01) (enacted as C-2).
184. See id. §§ 28.01(1), 28.01(2)(a)-(d), 28.01(3).
185. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 124, at§ 48.52 repealed by C-130, CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d Parliament, 2d Sess., § 66.52
(enacted as C-2); see also Copyright Update, 13 CABLE COMMUNIQUE 1 (1989). Eleven copyright collectives, acting on behalf of copyright claimants, filed fourteen proposed tarriffs,
statements of proposed royalties, with the Copyright Board on July 1, 1989, which was the
filing deadline. See id. The Copyright Board published these tariffs, and, by law, cable licensees were given twenty-eight days to file written objections to the proposed royalties. Canadian Cable Association CEO, Michael Hind Smith, stated that "[t]he copyright collectives
have filed for two to three times the amount they should receive in the United States and at
least seven or eight times what Parliament envisioned when it endorsed copyright liability."
Id.
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tion of the Board. 186 The new subsection establishes guidelines regarding royalties for retransmission, royalty statements, filing and
time for filing, period of effectiveness, as well as rules for publicizing approved statements. 187 In addition, they speak to small retransmission system exceptions, royalty collection, nonmember
claims, and proper exclusion of remedies. 188 Another establishes
that the Governor in Council of the Board may vary the date of
royalty distribution but not their apportionment. 189
D.

The CRTC Role

The role of the CRTC will continue to be important even after
copyright revision. CRTC rules on distant signal import will continue to determine the extent of market exclusivity that can be
maintained for specific programs. 19° Financing of Canadian television programs, in particular, will depend on the suppliers' abilities
to sell the programs based on exclusivity and on market differentiation. 191 The FTA provides that existing measures imposed by the
FCC or the CRTC will be maintained, and new measures may be
introduced to enable local licensees of copyrighted programming to
exploit the commercial value of their licenses. 192 Because compulsory licensing does not speak to all program rights issues related to
distant signal importation, both agencies will continue to function
in maintaining and improving those rights. 193
Former United States Secretary of the Treasury James Baker
III perceives the FTA as a "win-win" enterprise. 194 Nevertheless,
the exemption of Canadian cultural industries is of particular concern to the billion dollar United States intellectual property industries that view the agreement as a "win-lose" enterprise. 195 The Canadian stand is perceived as protectionist, paradoxical and
186. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2<l Sess., § 66.52 (enacted as C-2).
187. See Canada Copyright Act, supra note 124, at§ 50.6 amended by C-130, CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d Parliament, 2d Sess., §§
70.6, 70.64(1)(2) (enacted as C-2).
188. Id. See also Retransmission Regulations, supra note 151, at 3.
189. Id.
190. P. Grant, supra note 34, at Dll.
191. See id.
192. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 2006(3)(b).
193. See P. Grant, supra note 34.
194. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1.
195. See id. These industries had hoped that the FTA would address video cassette
tape piracy and were disappointed about the local signal definition, etc. See id.
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confusing. 196 The revised Canadian Copyright Act, in conjunction
with the FTA, has the potential for controlling the unauthorized
retransmission of intellectual property. 197 But its effectiveness for
the United States and Canadian broadcasting industries has yet to
be ascertained. 198
E.

Public Sector and Private Sector Positions Regarding the
FTA

Several United States agencies and intellectual property industries have taken specific positions regarding the final provisions
of the FTA in relation to the cultural exemption. 199 These include
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), 200 the Motion
Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA), 201 and the
United States Trade Representative (USTR). 202 The Canadian Department of Communications has taken a position as well. 203
Since the Canadian legislature passed Bill C-58, the NAB has
been vehemently opposed to it and has vigorously supported efforts for its repeal. 20" The NAB was disappointed that the FTA
made no provision for repeal of the section of C-58 which it believes discriminates against the United States border broadcasters.206 It considers the retransmission exception a small concession
on the part of Canada and has resolved to continue strong opposition against the unfair treatment accorded border broadcasters
196. Fairness Bill Hearings, supra note 19, at 144-45. On the one hand, the Canadian
government seeks ethnocentrism, yet on the other, it ignored piracy to develop the cable
industry and to quench consumers' thirst for American cultural diffusion. See id.
197. See Berne Convention, supra note 11; see also UCC, supra note 11. Because of the
revision, international copyright conventions will come into focus. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Telephone Interview with Ben Ivens, Counsel for NAB Legal Dep't, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Ivens Interview]; Telephone interview with Mark
Kalmansohn, Director North American Anti-Piracy Operations, Sherman Oaks, California
(Jan. 19, 1989) [hereinafter Kalmansohn Interview]; Telephone Interview with Charles Roh,
Associate General Counsel to the USTR, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Roh
Interview]; Tritt Interview, supra note 75. The National Association of Broadcasters, The
Motion Picture Association of America, The United States Trade Representative and the
Canadian Department of Communications have all worked toward furthering their individual goals in relation to the FTA. Impressions of the results and ramifications of the negotiations are included in this note with their permission. See id.
200. See Ivens Interview, supra note 199.
201. See Kalmansohn Interview, supra note 199.
202. See Roh Interview, supra note 199.
203. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75.
204. See Ivens Interview, supra note 199.
205. See id.
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which it believes directly contradicts the spirit of FTA trade barrier elimination. 206
Although the MPEAA is gratified that the FTA obliges Canada to pass legislation subjecting cable companies to liability for
unauthori~ed retransmission of distant signals, it is greatly concerned over the addition of 32Km to the B contour. 207 This addition imposes an afflictive restriction on the royalties that can be
collected for retransmission. 208 The MPEAA's belief is that all signals entering a foreign nation should be deemed distant signals. 209
The MPEAA position is that Canada should not compare its signal
definition to the definition the United States has adopted. 210 It
finds such a comparison to be erroneous, because advertising revenues generated by the United States from Canadian signals is minuscule while the revenues generated in Canada by American signals is monumental. 211 The MPEAA will continue to lobby all
concerned for an equitable signal definition in the best interest of
United States copyright owners. 212
The USTR is satisfied with results of its FTA negotiations. 213
In simplistic terms, trade is barter, the exchange of one commodity
for another. 214 During the exchange process, negotiators must prioritize commodities that are on the table and must sacrifice the
less significant to gain an accord but still leave room for their future negotiation. m The USTR attempted to gain concessions on
C-58 and sought a broad agreement on intellectual property. 216
The USTR admits to falling short of that objective. However, its
position is that the FTA is a distinct improvement over the status
quo. 217 Canadian copyright revision and resultant remuneration for
retransmission in distant signals is far better than brazen abstraction of all United States signals without any remuneration. 218 To
have aborted the FTA on these grounds in hopes of obtaining the
perfect accord would have been ludicrous in the opinion of the
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
Kalmansohn Interview, supra note 199.
id.
id.
id.
id.
Kalmansohn Interview, supra note 199.
Roh Interview, supra note 199.
id.
id.
id.
id.
Roh Interview, supra note 199.
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USTR.219
Relinquishing retransmission was definitely in Canada's interest, as well as in the interest of the United States, because copyright holders in both countries feel the effect of piracy. 22° Furthermore, Canada simply could not have sustained unauthorized
retransmission on cultural grounds. 221 Although intellectual property has not been designated for further negotiation, the USTR
has not forgotten and will not ignore the industry's concerns. 222
The USTR .believes that the only way to resolve the border broadcasting dilemma is to persuade Canada that this specific means of
culture insulation is not necessary. 223 At the moment, that simply
is not possible. 224
According to the Canadian Department of Communications,
copyright revision is modeled on American copyright law, including
the compulsory licensing scheme. 225 It believes that United States
special interest groups want to dispose of the licensing scheme in
the United States and would prefer that Canada implement a system that provides more adequate compensation in view of the local
signal definition. 226
The Canadian position is that the 32Km addition to the B
contour is equitable and in the spirit of the FTA. 227 The addition
was adopted because it is needed to give an accurate definition
that encompasses a signal's total local coverage. 228 United States
special interest groups do not want the 32Km addition because it
means there will be fewer distant signals and, therefore, less remuneration. 229 If Canada considered all foreign signals distant, it
219. See id.
220. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Tritt Interview, supra note 75.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. See also FCC Wants Congress to Dump Compulsory Licenses, BROADCASTING, Oct. 31, 1988, at 29. The FCC will urge the lOlst Congress to abolish all or parts of the
twelve year-old compulsory copyright license. It believes this has hurt broadcasters and
cable programmers by permitting cable companies to carry "underpriced" broadcast signals.
If the licenses were abolished, copyright owners could negotiate licensing arrangements in a
competitive marketplace instead of being governed by the CRT's predetermined licensing
system. Id. at 30. The MPEAA believes that § 605 of the Communications Act could be
strengthened although it could represent "substantial compliance" with the "adequate measures" requirements of the Brussels Convention. MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note
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would be applying a discriminatory standard. 23° For example, just
as local Buffalo signals are available in Toronto, Toronto local signals are available in Buffalo. Whether or not Americans make use
of them is not of concern. The point is they are equally
available. 231
The FTA requires non-discriminatory treatment. 232 If Canada
treated all United States signals as distant, when according to
United States copyright law they are not, Canada would be applying a more favorable standard to the United States, and that
would not be in accord with the FTA. 233 Canadian intent is that its
copyright law will apply equitably to the signals of both nations. 234
E.

The FTA as a World Class Player

In bilateral terms, the success of the FTA is of major consequence to the United States. 236 On an international scale, however,
the impact of the FTA has an even greater significance because of
the precedent it sets in redefining the international order of cultural investments and services. 236 The FTA legitimates United
States attempts to extend free trade principals in those areas on a
global basis. 237 The premise is that if Canada has approved the
FTA, it is reasonable to expect that other nations would follow
suit, because United States penetration into their cultural service
and investment spheres is at a much lower level than in Canada. 238
Assuredly, international redefinition of intellectual property
rights would guarantee a higher rate of return to United States
intellectual property industries in royalty and patent payments, in
remuneration to cultural producers, and in motivating revision of
existing international copyright conventions and trade agreements
to include technology and cultural forms of information process10, at 44.
230. See MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 44; see also Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, supra note 113.
231. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 2006.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See Bacon, Will North America Follow Europe's Lead?, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1988,
at 1, col. 4. The success or failure of the FTA will greatly influence the possibility of entering into similar agreements with Mexico and perhaps Japan. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98.
238. See Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1.
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ing. 239 The FT A appears to be a first step toward that end, especially in terms of signal piracy. 240
For the past two years, United States trade negotiators have
attempted to liberalize GATT global trading rules to include the
cultural services and investment areas, and in the Uruguay Round
of negotiations, the United States and Canada are working together to expand GATT coverage to include those areas. 241 FTA
ratification and implementation should be a motivating factor in
these negotiations and should also encourage global trade liberalization.242 United States chief GATT negotiator, James Baker III,
stated that "the United States-Canadian agreement is a lever to
achieve more open trade; .... nations are forced to recognize that
the United States will devise ways to expand trade with or without
them." 243
As a move toward economic harmonization in North America,
the FTA is even weightier. 244 During the 1988 presidential campaign, President Bush suggested a North American Compact to
open trade between Canada, Mexico and the United States. 246 Because this prospect appeals to both political factions, the evolution
of a North American Common Market could materialize in the future.246 Canada is resource rich but population poor. 247 Mexico is
debt-ridden, has an abundance of oil, but is an over-populated developing nation in need of investment and technology to spur economic growth. 248 The United States needs resources, workers and
more markets for its exports. 249 The North American population is
at 355 million. 260 This is ten percent larger than the European
community, which is moving toward economic integration in
1992. 261 If the FTA is successfully implemented and works well,
the face of North America will be forever altered. 262 In the future,
239. See
240. See
241. See
242. See
243. See
244. See
245. See
246. See
agreement.
247. See
248. See
249. See
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See

id.
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113.
Free Trade Agreement, supra note 98.
id.
Rowen, supra note 14, at F8, col. 1.
Bacon, supra note 235, at 1.
id. Both economies will be improved by this agreement. See id.
id. Republicans and Democrats recognize the power inherent in this type of an
id.
Bacon, supra note 235, at 1.
id.

id. Economic integration will resemble that of the EEC.
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if a North American free trade area becomes a reality, Canada,
Mexico and the United States would emerge as a unified influential force in the global economic arena. 263

IV.

fOTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED COPYRIGHTED
SIGNAL RETRANSMISSION

Although there are no simple answers to the signal piracy
problem on an international scale, a workable solution may evolve
in applying one or more of the following measures: international
copyright treaties in conjunction with bilateral trade accords that
implement copyright revisions, retaliatory mirror legislation, or
criminal prosecution for the sale or possession of illegal decoders.

A.

The Berne Convention

The United States and Canada are signatories to both major
international copyright agreements, the Berne Convention26" and
the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC). 266 Although the
United States is a signatory to the only international agreement
that specifically refers to satellites, the Convention Relating to the
Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (Brussels Satellite Convention), Canada is not a signatory. 266
On October 31, 1988, the United States became the seventyseventh signatory to the Berne Convention. m That Convention
253. See id. By virtue of the combined population and the combined resources, products, and size, the bargaining and buying power of Canada, Mexico, and the United States
would be the strongest in the "global village." See id.
254. See Berne Convention, supra note 11; see also E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 49-54 (1980).
255. See UCC, supra note 11; see also UCC, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.l.A.S. No.
7868 reprinted in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Item B (1971).
There is no minimum level of protection for foreign copyright holders. If a nation has no
copyright laws which specifically address redistribution of copyrighted signals, then a U.S.
copyright holder will not have enforceable rights against piracy. Canada recognizes the 1952
text and was not obligated to give "national treatment" prior to its copyright revision. See
also E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, supra note 254, at 57-61. See generally David, Basic Principles of International Copyright, 21 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 1 (1974).
256. See Brussels Convention, supra note 11. For non-copyright protection against misuse of private satellite signals, this convention does not apply to signals intended for the
general public or retransmissions by authorized recipients. The property transmitted in sig- ·
nals is unprotected. Signatories may exclude cable operations from treaty provisions which
depend on regulation according to each signatory's standard. A signatory may take definitive action to counter signal piracy and has autonomy in determining appropriate copyright
law. See id.
257. See MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, .s upra note 15. The Senate resolution ratifying the Berne Convention, H.R. 462, was signed by President Reagan on Oct. 31,
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provides specific protection to copyright owners of artistic and literary works, as well as protection to the authors of these works. 268
In addition, it grants authors the exclusive right to communicate
their works to the public through broadcasting or any other
means. 259 The Berne Convention further permits signatories to implement compulsory copyright licenses relating to telecommunications.260 Any and all sanctions follow national legislation. 261 Nations that are signatories to the Berne Convention, must provide
foreign authors with the same treatment that they afford their nationals.262 Under Berne, signatories are also bound by minimum
mandatory rights, which state that foreign copyright owners must
receive a minimum level of protection regardless of the protection
that nationals are afforded. 263
Despite this rule, controversy exists over the applicability of
the Berne Convention to satellite telecommunications. 264 For some
time, there has been a debate over whether cable retransmission of
copyrighted television broadcast signals violates Article llbis,
which pertains to broadcasts. 266 Some experts maintain the literal
language of Berne precludes finding liability. 266 Those concerned
about copyright owners' economic rights believe that liability may
1988.
258. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 1, 2, 14bis.
259. Id. art. llbis. The primary importance of the Berne Convention is that it is the
only international treaty that expressly grants rights to authors instead of only protecting
against unauthorized use of their copyrighted works. Id. art. 1. See MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 48.
260. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. llbis.
261. Id. art. 36.
262. Id. art. 5(1). This article states:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected under this
convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights
which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well
as the rights specially granted by this Convention.
Id .
263. See id. arts. 2.2bis, 7(4) (examples of regulations).
264. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. llbis. This article addresses broadcasting
and communications by "wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images" but does not refer to
satellite communications. In the industry, it is argued that relevancy to satellites can be
inferred. See id. See also MPEAA Memo on Satellites, supra note 10, at 47.
265. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. llbis. Id.
266. See, e.g., Dittrich, Cable Television and Copyright Problems, 15-16 W.l.P.O. 26,
28-31 (1979-89) (Insisting that "communication to the public," exempts cable systems from
liability, because transmissions are to select subscribers and not off-air). See also Szilagyi,
Questions of Broadcasting by Satellite with Special Reference to Authors' Rights, 17 COPYRIGHT 222 (1981) (discussing the meaning of "communication to the public" in relation to
satellite broadcasts).
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be found within the ambit of Article llbis. 267 Two European cases
have dealt with this problem. 268
In its present state, the Berne Convention does not protect
against signal piracy unless a nation has ratified at least the 1948
Brussels revision, which expanded Article llbis. 269 For example,
Canada is only a signatory to the 1928 revision, which does not
address retransmission by cable. 270 Such protection is inferred in
Article 11 bis of the 1948 revision. 271 In view of Canadian cable systems' abstraction of American border broadcasting and premium
television signals, it appears that Canada exempted itself from any
obligation to United States copyright holders, because it was not
liable under the 1928 Berne revision prior to its copyright
revision. 272
Furthermore, no mm1mum treatment level exists under the
UCC, and signal protection is not available under the 1952 accord
267. See, e.g., Walter, Diffusion by Wire in the Copyright Law of the Federal Republic
of Germany and of Austria, with Particular Reference to the Rediffusion of Broadcasts, 12
W.l.P.O. 279, 281-83 (1976). See generally Working Group on the Problems in the Field of
Copyright and So-Called Neighboring Rights Raised by the Distribution of Television
Programmes by Cable, 13 W.l.P.O. 246 (1977).
268. Coditel SA v. Cine Vog Films SA, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 833. The Court of
Justice of the European Communities found:
The owner of the copyright in a film, and his assigns, have a legitimate right to
expect that their revenue will be based on a certain number of performances in a set
geographic area.
The owner of a copyright in a film has a legitimate right in authorizing a television showing of his work only after it has appeared in movie theatres for a set period of time.
The rules of the EEC treaty relating to freedom to provide ser\fices do not preclude a copyright owner or his assignee from contractually limiting the geographic
limits of the performance.
Id. at 833. See also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Stichting tot Exploitatae Centrale
Antenne-Inrichting Amstelveen, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Case No. 11.739 (1981),
reprinted in MPEAA Press Release, Jan. 18, 1982 (cable systems must now obtain permission by contract prior to retransmission of copyrighted works).
269. See S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 § 3.1, at 81, 81-125 (1987).
270. The United Kingdom gave notice for Canada on January 1, 1924. Id. § 3.22, at 98
& n.108. The 1928 text of Article llbis speaks only to public performance and does not
address specific methods of communication to the public. Id. See also § 3.43. Article
llbis(l)(i) was extended to include television broadcasts, retransmissions, and transmissions
to the public. It states: "(i) the public performance of their works, including such public
performance by any means or process." Id.
271. Id . §§ 8.74-8.88, at 435-53. Under Article llbis(l)(ii), "authors may authorize any
communication to the public ... by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, where this
is done by an organization other than the original one." Id.
272. See S. RICKETSON, supra note 269, at 98.

Published by SURFACE, 1989

31

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 6

200

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 16:169

to which Canada has acceded. 273 Finally, Canada is not a signatory
to the Brussels Satellite Convention. 274 Thus, Canada had no accountability to the United States until it signed the FTA, which
obligated it to implement its copyright act that enables the "national treatment,, aspect of the Berne Convention and the UCC. 276
This same defect applies to other nations that have not changed
their copyright laws.
B. Retaliatory Remedies
At the present time, the United States can invoke retaliatory
action against discriminatory foreign practices that injure its export of goods or services. 276 In 1976, the United States began retaliation against Bill C-58 by enacting mirror legislation, 277 which included non-deduction of convention expenses in Canada, 278
273. UCC, art. I, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.l.A.S. No. 7868 reprinted in
UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Item B (1971). The protection
outlined in the UCC is available to an American author regardless of where the work is first
published. The requisite for protection is the requirement that the symbol (c), the name of
the copyright owner, and the year of first publication appear. Id. art. 111(1). The UCC was
revised in 1971 in Paris. At that time, Article IVbis was added. Canada did not accede to the
1971 revision and it is evident that it did not regard signal retransmissions as protected
works. Id. art. IVbis(l).
274. Brussels Convention, supra note 11. Adopted in 1974, this Convention has been
ratified by only nine nations. See also Price, supra note 3, at 93 (Requirement that each
nation takes measures to prevent distribution on or from its territory of program carrying
signals by a distributor for whom it is not intended). See also E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON,
supra note 254, at 82 (stating that one of the key problems for Brussels Convention drafters
was to work out the "balance between the rights of broadcasting organizations and rights of
contributors to programming; i.e., authors, performers and other holders of rights"); Szilagyi, supra note 266, at 223 (states that background to the Brussels Convention suggests
that drafters were mainly concerned with the economic interests of the broadcasting organizations and their right to exclusive control over programming transmitted by satellite).
275. See Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. 5(1). See also Smith, Should the
Motion Picture Industry Support or Oppose U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention?, 10
ENT/SPORTS L. 19 n.5 (1987)(stating that the 1952 UCC does not include art. 1Vbis(2). which
can be construed to address broadcasting).
276. See D. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 93 (1988)(stating that this right is established under § 301 of the Trade Act of
1974).
277. See Hagelin & Janisch, The Border Broadcasting Dispute in Context, in CULTURES IN COLLISION: THE INTERACTION OF U.S. BROADCAST TELEVISION POLICIES, supra note
33, at 50-55. Various mirror legislation bills were introduced. However, Canada remained
firm. See id.
278. Id. at 53. As Andrew Stoller stated:
Linkage of U.S. action on para. 602 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 with Canadian
action on C-58 ... severely restricted income tax deductions by U.S. taxpayers for
the costs of attending conventions outside the United States, and its enactment was
said to have cost Canadian businesses hundreds of millions of dollars in lost
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possible FCC limitation on Canadian investments in United States
cable systems, 279 tax restrictions for advertising on Canadian stations, 280 and a restriction on the Telidon videotext import. 281
In addition, Congress passed different versions of H.R. 3, the
1987 Omnibus Trade Bill, which extensively altered United States
trade laws. 282 The cumulative effect is to facilitate obtaining import relief for United States industries. 283 These bills will transfer
authority from the President to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), who will then make the determinations regarding offending issues. 284 Mandatory retaliation is provided against
nations that consistently indicate a pattern of import barriers such
as Japan. 286 These bills also define 'actionable acts and practices,
for example, "export targeting," and allow shortened time periods
for discussions on taking action. 286 By limiting presidential discrerevenues.

Id.
279. See A Bill to Amend the Constitution Act of 1934, S. 2172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). This solution was proposed by Senator Barry Goldwater, but the concept had been
rejected by the FCC in 1980. Id. at 55.
280. See NAB Report, supra note 26, at 67, 68. Legislation sponsored by Senator John
Danforth (R-Mo.) in 1984 was amended to section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, by the 98th Congress, denying tax deductions to United States advertisers for commercials placed on foreign stations in nations whose tax laws resemble C-58. Id. The amendment states:
§ 232(j)(l) In General. No deduction shall be allowed ... for any expenses of an
advertisement carried by a foreign broadcast undertaking and directed primarily to
a market in the United States. This paragraph shall apply only to foreign broadcast
undertakings located in a country which denies a similar deduction for the cost of
advertising directed primarily to a market in a foreign country when placed with a
United States undertaking.
§ 232(j)(2) Broadcast Undertaking. For purposes of ii 1, the term broadcast undertaking includes (but is not limited to) radio and television stations. (b) The
amendment made to subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after the
date of enactment of this Act.
Id.
281. See A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Deny the Deduction
for Amounts Paid or Incurred for Certain Advertisements Carried by Certain Foreign
Broadcast Undertakings, S. 2051, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). This bill was amended by the
addition of § 280 E which created an "Expanded Mirror Bill." Added by Senator Patrick
Moynihan, the amendment denied tax deductions and credit for the purchases of Canadian
videotext technology. Id. at 54.
282. See D. STEGER, supra note 276, at 92.
283. See id. at 96. Ambassador Simon Reisman believes the enactment of either bill
would impair the benefits and objectives of the FTA. See id.
284. See id. at 93, 94. Changes to § 301 of the 1974 Trade Act will protect and promote
United States industries rather than just settle disputes.
285. See id. This would be enforced against nations with an established pattern of import restrictions.
286. See id. at 93. Foreign policies or practices denying "national treatment" to goods,
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tion and by requiring mandatory action in specific instances, Congress hopes to make Section 301 more responsive to United States
industry needs. 287 If these changes are implemented, it is reasonable to expect that there will be more investigations and retaliatory
actions instituted within shorter time frames. 288
The Omnibus Bill would also amend Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, which authorizes the International Trade Commission
(ITC) to exclude foreign imports that violate intellectual property
or antitrust laws that injure United States industries. 289 The bill
contains amendments that would eliminate the injury requirement
in cases involving intellectual property rights. 290 Actions brought
under this section are more expeditious than court actions because
the ITC must complete its investigation within an eighteen month
period while court actions take several years. 291
For aggrieved intellectual property industries, relief from unfair foreign trade practices is available under the appropriate sections of the 1974 Trade Act and the Tariff Act of 1930. 292 By
amending the pertinent sections, Congress gives these industries
powerful legislative ammunition with which to counter piracy of
intellectual property in foreign nations. 293 It is possible, however,
that Canada will be exempted from the Omnibus Trade Bill, because in the future, such problems will be addressed bilaterally
under the dispute settlement provisions of the FTA. 294 In any
event, other nations certainly will not be exempt, and in United
States dealings with those nations, the intellectual property industries will continue to have a powerful friend in Congress. 295
services, or investments become actionable in the Senate bill.
287. See id. at 94.
288. If § 301 is amended, the intellectual property indu~tries can expect less bureaucracy when redressing their grievances.
289 . .See id. at 94. The ITC can order offending entities to curtail their unfair trade
practices.
290. Id . Both bills also expand the definition of a United States industry, i.e. coverage
for intellectual property will include trade secrets and common law trademarks. Id.
291 See id. ITC action would vastly accelerate import relief because of the legislated
time frame. There are no specific time frames in court actions. See id.
292. See Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 15201 (1982) (used to implement Article
XIX of the GATT where a domestic industry is endangered); Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19
U.S.C. § 1001 (1958) (empowering the ITC to ban imports that impair an established, well
run intellectual property industry).
293. See generally, D. STEGER, supra note 276. Retaliatory action available in appropriate legislation should act as a disincentive to international signal piracy. See id.
294. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 113, at ch. 18, art. 1805.
295. See D. STEGER, supra note 276. Congress is making a serious attempt to address
the intellectual property industry's problems, because it recognizes its importance to U.S.
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C. Direct Action Against "High-Tech Pirates"
In the 1970s, the Canadian Parliament redrafted Section
287(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to include telecommunications and
broadly defined it to cover services provided by wire or cable. 296
Two provisions specifically apply to theft of telecommunications
services. 297 Section 287.1 makes possession, sale, or use of a decoder without payment for a telecommunications service a punishable offense. 298 A violation of this section is punishable for up to
two years. 299
Although some relief is possible under these sections, amendments to the Criminal Code, and further judicial definition, interpretation, and enforcement may be required to enhance remedies. 300 In 1984, the United States addressed this same problem by
amending the Communications Act of 1934. 301 Because Canadian
copyright revision focuses directly on retransmission of distant signals and not on reception, no liability is imputed to equipment
vendors of illegal decoders. 302 But, because Canada recognizes
piracy as a criminal act in its own laws, some relief will be imputed
to United States television signals under "national treatment," as
provided in the Berne Convention and the UCC, when Canadian
copyright revision is complete. 303
If the United States and Canada combine efforts to prosecute
trade. See id.
296. See Brief for MacLean-Hunter Cable TV Ltd. 17; Memorandum Concerning § 287
of the Criminal Code (1988) [hereinafter Criminal Code Memo]. Under § 287(1)(b), anyone
who uses a telecommunications service fraudulently, commits theft. Under § 287(2), telecommunications means any reception or transmission of signals by electronic or magnetic
system. Under § 287.1(1), anyone who illegally sells, manufactures, or distributes a device to .
obtain signal reception without payment for telecommunication services is liable to imprisonment for two years. Under § 287.1(2), such devices are confiscated and may be destroyed.
See id.

297. See id.
298. Id. § 287.1.
299. Id. § 287.1(1).
300. See Criminal Code Memo, supra note 296.
301. See Communications Act of 1934 § 705 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605). In the United
States, vendors and users of unauthorized decoders can be prosecuted. See also Letter from
FCC Chairman Dennis Patrick to United States Attorney General Edwin Meese (May 1988)
[hereinafter FCC Letter]. Criminal actions are prosecuted by the Department of Justice
under the discretion of local United States Attorneys after FBI or local police investigations.
The FCC provides technical assistance. Various prosecutions are brought by the state authorities under state theft of services statutes. See id.
302. See C-130, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 33d
Parliament, 2d Sess., § 18.1 (enacted as C-2); see also P. Grant, supra note 34.
303. See P. Grant, supra note 34; see also Claridge, Two Rulings May Spur Crackdown
on Sale of Pay-TV Descramblers, Globe & Mail, Jan. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
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offenders under the domestic laws of both nations, the manufacture, illegal import, subsequent sale, and use of these unauthorized
decoders would be frustrated. 30" This could cripple satellite signal
piracy in both nations. 306 During the summer of 1988, United
States federal law enforcement officers began a crackdown on satellite dealers in Indiana, Montana, New York, Oklahoma and
Texas who trafficked in illegal decoders such as VideoCipher II. 306
Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the first
legal search of a satellite consumer's home and seized illegal
descrambling equipment. 307 Although there were no arrests in
those investigations, indictments may be handed down following
analysis of the decoder units. 308 Because the import and export of
restricted communications technology is illegal, both United States
customs officials and the Canadian Customs Service are involved in
apprehending pirates. 309 United States violators face criminal
charges and fines; Canadian violators face prosecution under the
Criminal Code. 310 If successful, ·such direct action could motivate
other nations to implement similar enforcement policies against
piracy.
Whatever remedy the United States intellectual property industries apply-whether international conventions in league with
the FTA, specific domestic mirror legislation, or reciprocity between the United States and Canada in penalizing sellers and consumers of illegal communications technology under respective
criminal codes and through a bilateral tribunal-as a result of the
FTA, there is now a viable means of signal piracy control in Canada. 311 Determination of the most effective method will certainly
produce strong debate among the affected United States intellectual property industries before enactment of the most helpful
remedy. 312
304. See id. If each nation does its share in convicting offenders and in upholding and
enforcing stiff penalties, the risks would outdistance the gains from these illegal acts. See id.
305. See FCC Letter, supra note 301.
306. See Buckman, Feds Crack Down on Illegal Descramblers, ELECTRONIC MEDIA,
Aug. 1988, at 1, col. 3.
307. See id. See also FCC Letter, supra note 301.
308. See Criminal Code Memo, supra note 296, at 17.
309. See Buckman, supra note 306.
310. See Pirates Nabbed at Canadian Border, Hollywood Rep., Oct. 5, 1988, at 19, col.
3.
311. Any of these remedies will have a positive anti-piracy effect and, if enforced, could
neutralize or even eliminate the problem.
312. These industries must act uniformly against piracy once they agree upon the best
remedy.
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CONCLUSION

It is likely that the FT A will act as a blueprint for accords
with other nations, not only regarding bilateral trade, but also in
the struggle for adequate intellectual property protection and compensation. Canada's recognition of copyright in distant signals will
set a standard for other nations, and may fortify the United States
position on signal piracy in the Caribbean Basin nations and in
·
Mexico.
Canada's copyright revision will strengthen and enhance the
value of international copyright conventions by validating their
"national treatment" provisions and making them functional. In
addition, the revision could motivate other nations to take similar
initiatives in their copyright laws. The best way of eliminating
piracy of intellectual property is through the coordinated use of
properly amended copyright laws and international copyright conventions that have also been revised to meet advanced technology
requirements. The FTA should prove to be a giant step toward equitable treatment on an international scale and should act as an
inspiration to and throughout the "global village."

Nancy R. Weisberg
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